p. 51 The point is that identity is conceptual or categorical. It involves an event-recurrence within a category. An object individuates a concept within an event-recurrence. The smaller the category, the closer we get to the identity of individuals.
p. 53 In contrast to this [object-oriented] mode of thought, process thinking entails an event-ontology. For microgenetic theory, an object is always an event. It is not a slice in time but has a temporal history, minimally the change that actualizes the object, its momentary becoming-into-being. … An object is a theoretical construct in an extended duration that includes a no-longer-existing past.
p.55 The solidity of an object like a tree owes to the repeatability of its recurrence. The fluidity of one like music owes to the novelty in each replacement.
p.61 On this view, natural relations within objects or within the mind/brain, and by implication within non-cognitive events, are internal to the totality of nature or cognition, in which every particular is a momentary contrast.
p.61 Propositions turn relations into objects. The relation objectifies in the judgment.
p. 63 …all genuine relations are diachronic…
p. 64 Change is the other side of sameness or stability.
p. 66 Categories are grounded in “drive representations” …
p. 71 A fully actual world would be one of substance with no possibility of progression. We live on the edge of a world that is continuously becoming actual.